In the United States, antitrust authorities rely heavily on numerical measures of local banking market concentration such as the Herfindahl Hirschmann Index to assess the likely competitive effects of proposed bank mergers and acquisitions. This approach to antitrust enforcement relies on two important assumptions: (1) that markets for at least some types of banking products are local in scope, and (2) that market concentration measures can serve as effective proxies for banks' abilities to extract monopoly rents. This paper uses balance sheet data from most banks operating in the United States in 1988States in , 1992States in , 1996States in , and 1999 to test these assumptions. We test the assumption that banking markets are local in scope by looking for systematic cross-market differences in the interest rates paid on retail deposit products. We find strong evidence that the geographic scope of markets for NOW accounts did not expand beyond local market boundaries in the 1990s, but we can neither confirm nor reject the hypothesis of a broadening in scope of markets for MMDA and savings accounts. We test the assumption that concentration measures are related to deposit account interest rates using a number of different regression model specifications. Local concentration measures are strongly negatively related to interest rates paid on NOW and savings accounts in nearly all model specifications. The results are somewhat weaker for MMDA accounts, but we still find significant negative relationships in some model specifications in all years. State-level concentration measures are negatively related to deposit interest rates offered on NOW and money market accounts, even in those cases where there is strong evidence that markets are smaller than statewide. This suggests that the simple structure-conductperformance paradigm in which local market concentration alone drives pricing power may be too simplistic.
Introduction
In the United States, the Department of Justice and bank regulatory authorities (the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) have joint responsibility for assessing the competitive implications of proposed bank mergers and acquisitions. The relevant bank regulator must determine that a proposed transaction will not have a significantly adverse effect on competition before the deal can be consummated. The Justice Department has the option to challenge the proposed transaction in court if it independently concludes that the merger or acquisition is likely to result in a significant increase in market power.
Because of the large number of bank mergers proposed each year, both bank regulators and the Justice Department make use of simple numerical market concentration measures to identify mergers that are likely to raise competitive concerns. This screening approach explicitly relies on two important assumptions: (1) markets for at least some banking product lines are local in scope, and (2) deposit market shares and deposit-based Herfindahl concentration measures (HHIs) are effective proxies for banks' abilities to extract monopoly rents in those product lines. The two assumptions are intertwined because the geographic scope of banking markets determines how bank market shares and Herfindahl concentration measures are calculated.
The assumptions underpinning the use of local market HHIs to assess the likely competitive impact of a proposed bank merger are supported by an extensive body of empirical evidence. Analysis of household and small business survey data by Kwast, Starr-McCluer and Wolken (1997) and, more recently, by Amel and Starr-McCluer (2002) shows that retail banking customers overwhelmingly obtain their deposit services from banks that operate nearby offices. Because these studies examine only equilibrium behavior and do not explore how consumers respond to price differences, they do not provide definitive evidence that markets are local. However consumers' strong apparent preference for local banks is highly suggestive that retail banking markets are locally limited. Studies of bank pricing behavior by Berger and Hannan (1989) , Calem and Carlino (1991) , and Hannan (1997) all find negative relationships between measures of local market concentration, including the HHI, and interest rates paid to depositors.
While correlation does not necessarily imply causation, these findings are generally interpreted as supportive of the view that local concentration measures are good proxies for bank market power. Radecki (1998) argues that changes in technology and/or consumer preferences may have broadened the scope of retail banking markets in recent years, implying that local concentration measures are no longer appropriate for use in banking antitrust analysis. Using data on deposit interest rates offered in a sample of urban markets, Radecki shows that banks that operate branches throughout a state frequently offer the same deposit interest rates in a number of metropolitan areas within that state. He interprets this failure to price discriminate across local markets as evidence that deposit markets may actually be statewide in scope. Using very similar data, Heitfield (1999) confirms Radecki's empirical finding for statewide banks, but also finds significant crosscity differences in the interest rates paid on comparable deposit products when both statewide banks and banks that operate in a single metropolitan area are taken into account. Heitfield interprets this result as suggesting that statewide banks may choose not to price discriminate across local areas for reasons unrelated to an expansion of geographic market boundaries. A difficulty with both studies is that they focus on the largest banks in selected urban markets. They ignore many smaller banks operating in urban markets, and all banks operating in rural markets. Rural markets tend to be much more highly concentrated than urban markets, and consequently tend to receive disproportionate attention from antitrust authorities. This paper assesses the usefulness of local concentration measures in antitrust analysis by applying techniques similar to those employed by Radecki (1998) and Heitfield (1999) to a much larger sample of banks covering a broader range of markets and time periods. We achieve our large sample size by using data on interest expenses and deposit account balances to construct average interest rate measures for NOW accounts, money market deposit accounts, and savings accounts offered by most banks operating in the United States in 1988 States in , 1992 States in , 1996 States in , and 1999 . Section 2 explains how our interest rate measures were constructed and discusses some of the advantages and disadvantages of using them. Section 3 tests the hypothesis that geographic markets are statewide in scope against the alternative that they are more narrowly defined by looking for systematic differences in interest rates paid on comparable deposit products in different local markets within a state. A finding of significant interest rate differences indicates that comparable deposit products offered in different localities within a state cannot be close substitutes for one another and therefore cannot lie in a single statewide geographic market. Our findings suggest that geographic markets for NOW accounts remain local, but that the geographic scope of markets for money market deposit accounts and savings accounts may have broadened over the last decade.
If retail banking markets are indeed local, and there is a relationship between market concentration and pricing power, then we should observe an inverse relationship between local market concentration measures and deposit interest rates. In the same study discussed earlier, Radecki suggests that this relationship may have weakened during the 1990s. Using 1996 data, Radecki finds no evidence of a significant relationship between local market concentration and deposit interest rates, but does find a significant negative relationship between state level concentration measures and deposit interest rates. Section 4 explores this issue more fully. We find that the relationship between local market concentration and deposit interest rates has not weakened over time for NOW accounts, MMDA accounts, or savings accounts. We also find evidence of a negative relationship between state level concentration measures and deposit interest rates for both NOW accounts and MMDA accounts, which appears to have strengthened considerably during the 1990s. The latter finding raises some interesting policy questions that are discussed in Section 5.
Interest Rate Data
Banks offer a variety of financial products to their retail customers, including mortgages and home equity loans, auto loans, credit cards, and several different types of deposit accounts. For most retail loan products, prices depend on customer-specific characteristics, such as credit rating and income, which cannot easily be observed by outside researchers. In contrast, interest rates and fees for deposit products do not generally reflect customer-specific characteristics. Given that the focus of our analysis is the relationship between observable market characteristics and the prices offered by banks operating in those markets, it is important that we be confident that observed price differences across markets do not simply reflect unobserved differences in the composition of customers in different markets. For this reason, our analysis focuses on interest rates paid on relatively homogeneous classes of interest-bearing deposit accounts: NOW accounts, money market deposit accounts (MMDAs), and savings accounts. The Monthly Survey of Selected Deposits (MSSD) has been used as a source of data on deposit interest rates in numerous studies, including Berger and Hannan (1989) , Calem and Carlino (1991) , and Prager and Hannan (1998) We then calculate the annual interest rate for each year as the annualized geometric mean of the quarterly interest rates.
Finally, observations in the top percentile and bottom percentile are dropped.
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Summary statistics for the imputed interest rate data are presented in Table 1 .
Regional Price Correlations
The geographic scope of any good or service market depends on the extent to which consumers are willing to substitute similar products sold at different locations for deposit accounts, so we are not able to make the appropriate adjustments.
one-another. Ideally, therefore, an empirical study of market definition should measure the importance of product location versus other differences in product characteristics (including price) in determining how consumers choose among competing alternatives.
Unfortunately, such studies require very detailed data on prices and quantities and/or very strong assumptions about the behavior of producers and consumers. In banking, detailed quantity data are difficult to come by and exogenous changes in product prices are nearly impossible to identify. Fortunately, in the absence of detailed information on supply and demand conditions, price data alone can provide enough information to test simple hypotheses relating to the geographic scope of markets.
Within a geographic market, both producers and consumers should view goods with similar attributes as close substitutes for one another, and market forces should act to equilibrate the prices of these goods. On the other hand, if similar goods lie in different geographic markets, they must be imperfect substitutes and their prices may differ substantially from market to market. Thus, a finding that the prices of goods with similar observable characteristics (i.e., members of the same product market) differ significantly across regions provides strong evidence that those regions constitute separate geographic markets.
Importantly, while regional price differences can rule out larger geographic markets, the opposite is not true. Similarities in prices across regions do not imply that those regions are part of the same geographic market. For example, a cup of coffee in
Berkeley, California and a cup of coffee in Washington, D.C. each cost about a dollar, but no one would argue that these two goods are close substitutes. Similarly, two deposit accounts offered in different regions may pay similar interest rates because of coincident supply and demand conditions, even though neither consumers nor producers treat these accounts as substitutes. Alternatively, even when local supply and demand conditions would lead to different equilibrium prices in two regions, a firm that operates in both regions may decide to charge the same prices in both regions because it believes that the costs of determining and maintaining different prices would exceed the benefits. Thus, taken by themselves, price data can only be used to test hypotheses in one direction.
They can provide evidence to reject hypotheses that geographic markets are "large", but they cannot provide evidence to reject hypotheses that markets are "small".
If In a world in which banks may operate in more than one narrow geographic region, there is no longer a clear correspondence between bank-level average interest rates and the average rates charged in individual regions. The most straightforward way to deal with this problem is to simply restrict attention to "locally based" banks whose deposit-gathering operations are heavily concentrated in a single metropolitan area or rural county. 5 In the current context, this approach has two shortcomings. First, it requires that we throw out a great deal of useful price data from geographically diversified banks. Second, and more importantly, it is likely to present an inaccurate picture of inter-regional price differences if locally based banks behave differently from other banks, or if consumers view their services as qualitatively different from those provided by larger, more diversified, banks.
This analysis makes use of an alternative approach that does not suffer from these shortcomings. We assume that a multimarket bank's average deposit interest rate depends, among other things, on a deposit-weighted average of the market conditions prevailing in all of the markets from which the bank derives its deposits. This assumption implies that the average interest rate offered by bank i, r i , can be described by the linear regression model s would be market dummy variables, but because some banks operate in more than one area these variables are shares that sum to one for each bank.
i X is a vector of bank-specific characteristics that are believed to influence the interest rates paid on deposits. This vector is included to allow for the possibility that deposit services offered by some types of banks are imperfect substitutes for the services offered by other types of banks. For example, some customers may be willing to pay a premium for the type of individualized service that they receive at a small, local bank, whereas others may appreciate the scope of services available from a larger, nationwide bank.
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The parameters 1 ρ through M ρ capture the effect of the geographic distribution of a bank's deposits on its average interest rate. If all local markets (MSAs and rural counties) within a state are part of the same geographic retail banking market, then the location of deposits should not matter and we should not be able to reject the hypothesis
within that state. A finding of significant differences in local effects within a state provides strong evidence against the hypothesis that all M localities lie in the same statewide geographic market. However, for reasons discussed earlier, failure to find such differences need not imply that banking markets are statewide in scope.
Equation (1) is estimated separately for each account type, state, and year, for each of the ten most populous states. 7 For some states, the total number of metropolitan areas and rural counties, and therefore the number of market effects, is quite large.
Collinearity problems arise when two local markets are served by the same set of banks and each of the banks derives approximately the same share of its deposits from each market (i.e, two of the local market variables are highly correlated with each other). To deal with this problem, we exclude from our analysis a small number of market pairs.
Separate analyses are undertaken for samples that include all local markets (urban and rural) within each state, and restricted samples containing only urban areas. The latter samples were used to examine the possibility that urban markets may be more closely integrated with one-another than with rural markets in the same state.
We examine within-state differences in local interest rate effects in two stages.
First we test the restriction
to determine whether observed differences are statistically significant. We then examine characteristics of the distributions of the local average interest rate effects to get a sense of whether those differences that are statistically significant are also economically meaningful. Tables 2 through 7 present results for three account types (NOW accounts, MMDAs, and savings accounts), in each of four years (1988, 1992, 1996, and 1999) , using both the full samples of markets and the restricted samples of only urban markets. 8 The columns labeled "F-test Statistic"
show the test statistics calculated for the parameter restriction that all local interest rate effects are the same within a state. The columns labeled "F-test P-value" report the probability that a number greater than the F-statistic would be generated from random data, assuming the null hypothesis of equal rates were true. A value in this column of less than 0.05 indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected at the five percent significance level. The next three columns report percentiles of the distributions of estimated local interest rate effects in each state, and the last column reports the interquartile range (the difference between the 75 th and 25 th percentiles). Percentiles and interquartile ranges are reported rather than more common summary statistics such as means and variances, because they are more robust to spurious results that arise from multicollinearity problems in some regressions.
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The results for NOW accounts are presented in Tables 2 and 3 Table 4 , when both urban and rural markets are considered, we find statistically significant differences in local effects in five of ten states in 1988, eight of ten states in 1992, five of ten states in 1996, but only two of ten states in 1999. Similar patterns can also be observed in the urban markets sample. Despite the fact that differences in local market effects appear to have become less statistically significant in recent years, the dispersion in these effects as measured by their interquartile ranges has not diminished over time for any state and has increased substantially in most cases. This suggests that bank-to-bank differences in MMDA interest rates have increased both across and within markets, a finding that is consistent with increased product differentiation across banks.
Results for savings accounts are mixed. As Table 6 shows, statistically significant differences in local market effects exist in some states in some years, but no obvious trends can be observed. Although the interquartile ranges of local market effects are widest for many states in 1999, differences in these ranges over time are less pronounced than for other types of accounts. Similar results are obtained when only urban markets are considered (Table 7) . Overall, the evidence against the statewide markets hypothesis is weaker for savings accounts than it is for NOW and money market accounts. These results are consistent with the interpretation that geographic markets for checkable, transaction-oriented accounts that involve frequent interaction with local bank branches are narrower in scope than those for longer-term savings products.
Price-Concentration Relationship
In this section, we consider the relationship between deposit interest rates and concentration, measured at both the local market level and the state level, using data from 1988, 1992, 1996 and 1999 . Following the previous literature, we estimate linear regression models in which the dependent variable is the deposit interest rate offered by a given bank on a particular type of deposit account, and the right hand side variables include a measure of local market concentration, bank characteristics, and market characteristics.
Our analysis differs from previous work in two important ways. First, as explained in Section 2 above, we employ a data source that provides consistent measures of deposit interest rates over time for a very large number of banking organizations.
Second, in addition to local market variables, we include state level concentration measures and state characteristics in each regression. This enables us to determine both whether the relationship between local market concentration and deposit interest rates has changed over time and whether the relationship between state level concentration and deposit interest rates has changed over time.
A potential problem afflicting this and previous studies of the relationship between local market concentration and prices derives from the fact that local market concentration is strongly negatively correlated with market size. For this reason, estimating a price-concentration relationship for a sample that includes banking organizations operating in both urban and rural markets may confound the effects of market size or other differences between urban and rural markets with the effects of concentration. To deal with this potential problem, we estimate separate regressions using both the full sample of banking organizations and a sub-sample that includes only those banks that derive more than half of their deposits from urban markets.
The following regression model is estimated for each of the three deposit account types included in our analysis: The unit of observation used in this analysis is the bank; however, many of our righthand-side variables reflect market or state level conditions. For banks that operate in more than one local ma rket, the value of each market level variable is the depositweighted average of the market level measure for all of the markets from which the bank derives its deposits. For example, if bank i derives 75% of its deposits from market A and 25% of its deposits from market B, the value of MKTCONC i would be equal to 0.75(MKTCONC A ) + 0.25(MKTCONC B ). Similarly, for banks whose operations cross state lines, the value of each state level variable is equal to the deposit-weighted average of the state level measures for each state from which the bank derives its deposits.
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Market concentration (MKTCONC i ) and state concentration (STATECONC i ) are each measured two different ways --using the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) and the three firm concentration ratio (CR3).
11 Control variables include bank size, as measured by the natural logarithm of bank assets, market size and state size, as measured by the natural logarithm of population, per capita income for the market and the state, the rate of growth in deposits over the preceding year for the market and the state, and a variable indicating the share of the bank's deposits derived from urban markets.
The results of estimating equation (2) are summarized in Tables 8 through 10 .
Given the large number of equations estimated (three types of accounts, four different years, full and restricted samples, and two alternative concentration measures) we economize on tables by presenting only the results of greatest interest in the context of 10 As a robustness check, we re-ran our analysis on a sub-sample of banks that derive at least 80 percent of their deposits from a single local market. The results were not substantively different from those reported in Tables 8-10 
Conclusion
Our analyses of within-state differences in interest rates paid on retail deposit accounts in 1988, 1992, 1996, and 1999 generally reject the hypothesis of statewide (as opposed to local) geographic markets for NOW accounts in all years and for MMDA accounts in all years except 1999. We cannot generally reject the hypothesis of statewide markets for savings accounts, except in 1992. Thus, while there is strong evidence that markets for NOW accounts did not grow larger during the 1990s, our results can neither confirm nor reject the hypothesis of a broadening of the geographic scope of markets for MMDA and savings accounts.
Our analysis of the effects of concentration measures on interest rates reveals that local concentration measures are negatively related to rates paid on NOW accounts in all years, regardless of whether all markets or only urban markets are examined and whether the Herfindahl index or the three-firm concentration ratio is used. In the case of savings accounts, we also find a negative relationship between local concentration and the deposit interest rate in fourteen out of sixteen cases. The results for MMDA accounts are somewhat weaker, but we still find evidence of a significant negative relationship in at least one of the four cases considered in each year, and in all four cases for 1999. Our results support the view that local market concentration is an important factor influencing bank pricing behavior.
We also find strong evidence that state-level concentration is negatively related to deposit interest rates offered on NOW and MMDA accounts in recent years. This is true even in those cases where we find strong empirical evidence that markets are local. This 
